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A META-ANALYSIS OF HYPOTHETICAL BIAS IN STATED PREFERENCE VALUATION 
 
Abstract 
Individuals are widely believed to overstate their economic valuation of a good by a factor of 
two or three.  This paper reports the results of a meta-analysis of hypothetical bias in 28 stated 
preference valuation studies that report monetary willingness-to-pay and that used the same 
mechanism for eliciting both hypothetical and actual values.  The papers generated 83 
observations with a median value of the ratio of hypothetical to actual value of 1.35, and the 
distribution has severe positive skewness.  Since a comprehensive theory of hypothetical bias has 
not been developed, we use a set of explanatory variables based on issues that have been 
investigated in previous research.  We find that a choice-based elicitation mechanism is 
important in reducing bias, though an insufficient number of studies and confounding with other 
variables prevents us from characterizing individual mechanisms.  We provide some evidence 
that the use of student subjects may be a source of bias, but this variable is highly correlated with 
group experimental settings and no firm conclusions can be drawn.  There is some weak 
evidence that bias increases when public goods are being valued, and that some calibration 
methods are effective at reducing bias.  Results are quite sensitive to model specification, which 
will remain a problem until a comprehensive theory of hypothetical bias is developed. 
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I. Introduction 
Recent empirical evidence suggests that stated preference (SP) valuation methods frequently 
overstate economic value, often by a large amount.  Harrison and Rutström (1999), for example, 
found that 34 of 39 SP observations had an average hypothetical bias of about 338 percent.  The 
well-known NOAA panel recommendations suggest that hypothetical values be divided by two, 
and List and Gallet (2001) found that on average, subjects responding to hypothetical situations 
overstated their preferences by a factor of about three. 1 
 At this juncture, basic questions about hypothetical bias in SP valuation continue to be 
debated. First, what is the actual magnitude of hypothetical bias associated with the SP valuation 
approach? Second, what factors are responsible for this bias?  This paper uses a meta-analysis to 
focus primarily on a reassessment of the magnitude of bias present in SP studies.  We also 
attempt to evaluate the effect of several alternative SP formats and other factors on the degree of 
hypothetical bias. However, as noted by Carson, et al. (1996), due to the lack of theory about the 
causes of hypothetical bias, missing data, and the need to use a large set of dummy variables, our 
ability to determine the factors responsible for hypothetical bias is rather limited. 
 Our results differ from previous work in two important respects. First, we find that 
hypothetical bias in SP studies may not be as important as most previous studies suggest. 
Second, we question the prevailing wisdom about several of the factors responsible for this bias. 
 
II. Revisiting the List and Gallet Results 2 
Since much of our analysis was conducted concurrent with the only other published meta-
analysis of hypothetical bias in stated values (List and Gallet, 2001, hereafter LG), we begin with 
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a summary of their study and a sensitivity analysis of their findings.  LG assume that actual cash-
based estimates are unbiased measures of value and define hypothetical bias as a calibration 
factor (CF) that is the ratio of the hypothetical to actual expression of value. LG include 29 
studies yielding 58 observations or calibration factors. Some studies derived several observations 
that LG report as a range, rather than as a single value.  LG report the results from three different 
regression models, using the minimum, median, or maximum calibration factor values as the 
dependent variable.3  The independent variables represent different experimental design 
parameters from the studies, including whether the calibration factor was based on an 
individual’s willingness-to-pay or a willingness-to-accept, the type of experiment (lab or field), 
type of good (private or public), the type of comparison (within or between group), and eight 
different types of elicitation mechanism.   
LG’s estimation results using either the natural log of the calibration factor or the 
absolute value of the natural log of the calibration factor are qualitatively similar.  LG mention 
that using a linear model, rather than semi-log, also yielded essentially the same conclusions.  
Since their results are not very sensitive to these differences, we focus on the natural log of the 
median value for ranges of the calibration factor.4 
List and Gallet argue that hypothetical bias should be greater in WTA studies than in 
WTP studies, because most respondents are much more familiar with WTP situations.  Using 
similar logic, bias associated with public goods is expected to exceed that of private goods since 
respondents are assumed to have more experience valuing private goods.  And incentive 
compatible elicitation methods, such as dichotomous choice, are expected to result in less 
hypothetical bias, all else held constant. 
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 Results of the LG analysis, summarized in the second column of Table I, indicate that the 
magnitude of hypothetical bias was statistically less for (a) WTP as compared to WTA 
applications, (b) private as compared to public goods, and (c) one elicitation method, the first 
price sealed bid, as compared to the Vickery second-price auction baseline.  In the next section, 
we test the robustness of these conclusions.   
<INSERT TABLE I> 
 
Procedures and Results 
Our sensitivity analysis of the LG results proceeded in two steps.  We began by validating LG’s 
coding of their data, and then tested the sensitivity of their results to particular observations and 
assumptions.  We disagreed with LG’s coding of several observations included in their analysis 
and grouped these disagreements into three “types of differences,” summarized in Table II.  ERE 
typo refers to observations that were reported incorrectly in their paper, but were correct in the 
actual data used in their regressions.  Making these changes to the data reported in the paper, we 
were able to duplicate their original results as shown in Table I.  Next, there were two 
observations that we could not find in the papers, so we did not include them.  There were also 
16 observations that appeared to be coding errors.  For example, LG recorded the Bohm (1972) 
study as making comparisons within groups, whereas this study actually compared results 
between groups for three of the four observations.  After making these changes, listed in Table 
II, we re-estimated the LG model.  The results are in Table I under the Revision 1 heading.  
Although these changes affected the coefficient values, the results are qualitatively similar.  This 
indicates that updating the LG data for typos and errors has a quantitative, but no qualitative, 
effect on their conclusions.  However, it is possible that their conclusions are not driven by the 
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experiment protocol variables, but rather the results from one or two studies.  We elaborate on 
this point below. 
<INSERT TABLE II> 
LG’s sample size is relatively small with insufficient variation for the model they 
estimated.  Using the revised LG data, there are 29 studies yielding 55 observations.  Table III 
contains a frequency distribution of the LG data for each of their independent variables. Most of 
the elicitation mechanisms have just one study using that format, and there are only eight WTA 
observations from six studies.  Moreover, two of these WTA observations are from a single 
study (Brookshire and Coursey (1987)) with calibration factors that are at least 17 times greater 
than the mean of the other six.  Given the paucity of WTA observations, it is possible that the 
significance of the WTP coefficient is entirely due to this study and has nothing to do with a 
fundamental difference between responses to WTP and WTA questions.  More importantly, 
Brookshire and Coursey (1987) use different mechanisms to elicit hypothetical and actual values 
(open-ended and Smith auction, respectively).  It is possible that their calibration factors 
confound hypothetical bias with free-rider bias due to changing from a demand revealing 
mechanism to one that is not. 
<INSERT TABLE III> 
We tested the sensitivity of the LG results to the two large WTA calibration factors 
(28.20 and 25.79) from Brookshire and Coursey by dropping these observations; the Revision 2 
results are reported in Table I.5  Consistent with the original LG results, private goods still 
produce a lower and statistically significant hypothetical bias than public goods.  However, the 
WTP coefficient is no longer statistically significant. It would be premature to conclude this 
suggests that there is no difference between WTP and WTA studies.  Rather, we interpret this to 
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mean that there are an insufficient number of observations to say anything about their relative 
impacts on hypothetical bias.   
We also did a similar analysis for the five elicitation mechanisms with just a single study.  
We ran a series of regressions in which we omitted, one at a time with replacement, the study 
and independent variable for first price sealed bid, provision point, Smith auction, random price 
auction and BDM.  The LG results were quite robust with respect to these changes.  In particular, 
the significance of the WTP dummy variable was consistently driven by Brookshire and Coursey 
(1987) and the coefficient on the private good dummy variable was consistently negative and 
significant.  The dummy variable for a within group comparison was never significant.  
In the Revision 3 regressions, we made another set of adjustments to the LG data for 
what we call differences in interpretation.  For some observations, we disagreed with LG about 
how to code the observation.  For example, the Bishop and Heberlein (1979) study does not 
report any actual WTP values.  It appears that the LG calibration factor is the ratio of a 
hypothetical WTP and an actual WTA.  Since this could confound hypothetical bias with 
differences in WTP/WTA, we decided not to include this observation.  Also, to avoid 
confounding hypothetical bias with changes in the elicitation mechanism, we only included 
studies that used the same mechanism for both the hypothetical and the actual valuation.  The 
interpretation differences are listed in Table IV.  These changes leave us with 32 observations 
from 21 studies.  The results of using all the changes for Revision 1, plus the interpretation 
differences, are reported in Table I, Revision 3.  After updating the LG data for coding 
differences and testing for the sensitivity of the results to particular observations, two key 
conclusions emerge: (1) the statistically significant difference between WTP and WTA in the 
original LG results is sensitive to two extreme values that use different elicitation mechanisms 
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for actual and hypothetical valuation, and (2) private goods continue to have a lower bias than 
public goods.  The negative coefficients for lab experiments and within group comparisons are 
now weakly significant at the 10 percent level.  A few elicitation mechanisms are also 
significant, but since most of these variables are based on just a single study, we hesitate to 
interpret this. 
<INSERT TABLE IV> 
In the next section, we present our meta-analysis using an expanded data set with a 
different set of criteria for including observations.  We estimate a different model than LG and 
arrive at somewhat different conclusions. 
 
III. Description of Data 
We were able to identify 59 studies that reported both hypothetical and actual values (there were 
an additional four studies that reported ratios of hypothetical and actual values, but not the 
respective values).  In order to include an observation from a paper, we used the following 
criteria: 
• The hypothetical and actual values had to be elicited using the same mechanism (for 
example, this would exclude Brookshire and Coursey (1987), because the hypothetical 
values were elicited using an open-ended format but the actual values were elicited using 
a Smith auction).  We imposed this requirement to avoid confounding any affects from 
the different elicitation mechanisms with hypothetical bias.  For nine studies, all the 
observations reported used different elicitation mechanisms so there are no observations 
from those papers in our sample. 
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• We only included WTP observations because, although it is possible that there are 
important differences between WTP and WTA responses, unfortunately there are not 
enough WTA studies to truly capture any such effects.  With only a small number of 
studies, a dummy variable might simply reflect the influence of a study, rather than that 
of WTA, on hypothetical bias.  This requirement removed five studies from the sample. 
• The hypothetical and actual values had to be WTP measured in currency, not, for 
example, as a percent of people responding “yes” to a dichotomous choice question.  All 
non-US currencies were converted to nominal US dollars.  Since our regression models 
use hypothetical and actual values as variables, this requirement keeps the units 
consistent.  We included dichotomous choice studies if the authors provided an estimate 
of WTP.  However, since many of these studies do not report monetary estimates of 
WTP, this group of studies may be under-represented in our sample. We were able to 
locate 13 such studies that provided hypothetical and actual percent “yes” responses, but 
were excluded because no cash-based WTP estimates were provided.  
After imposing these restrictions, our data set includes 28 studies yielding 83 observations (see 
Appendix A).  The variables used in the analysis are defined in Table V, and summary statistics 
are provided in Tables VI and VII.  LnHypValue is the natural log of the value elicited in a 
hypothetical setting, and lnActValue is natural log of the amount of cash actually paid by the 
respondent.  We assume that these cash-based estimates are unbiased measures of the true WTP.  
For each observation, we also calculate the calibration factor, CF, which is the ratio of 
hypothetical value to actual value; CF exceeds one in the presence of hypothetical bias.  
Consistent with LG and Harrison and Rutström (1999), the mean CF in Table VI is 2.60.  This 
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comes from a skewed distribution as indicated by a 1.35 median CF. Figure 1 presents the 
distribution of CFs.   
<INSERT TABLE V> 
<INSERT TABLE VI> 
<INSERT TABLE VII> 
<INSERT FIGURE 1> 
The variables Private (=1 for private goods, =0 for public goods), and Within (=1 for 
within group comparison, =0 for between group comparison) are defined the same as in LG.  We 
chose not to use the LG variable Lab because of challenges with precisely defining a laboratory 
experiment.  Clearly, the typical experiment run on a college campus using the student body in 
either a classroom or computer lab would be coded as Lab.  But what about a study such as 
Cummings, et al. (1995) in which members of a church group were asked about their WTP for 
an electric juicer?  Procedurally, these experiments were similar to the “typical” on-campus lab 
experiment, the differences were in the location (church vs. campus) and the subject pool 
(students vs. adults).  We created two new dummy variables, Student and Group, that are 
intended to capture essentially the same effects as LG’s Lab variable.  We coded an observation 
as Student = 1 if the subject pool was college students; Student = 0 if the subject pool was adults 
or adult students.  Group = 1 if values were elicited in a group setting such as a classroom, 
computer lab or church hall; Group = 0 if values were elicited in an individual setting such as a 
phone or mail survey.  We should note that the Group variable refers to the setting, not the nature 
of the decision.  If an individual completed a survey in the classroom, then Group = 1, and if 
there was group interaction, e.g. through a Vickrey auction, but values were elicited individually 
(such as the baseball card auctions in List (2003)) then Group = 0.  There is a high degree of 
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correlation between the Student and Group variables (Pearson correlation coefficient equals 
0.77), therefore we do not use both variables in the same model. 
LG included dummy variables for each of the elicitation mechanisms in their sample. 
However, there is not much variability in the elicitation mechanisms used.  In our data, the 
Vickrey auction accounts for 19% of the observations, dichotomous choice 25% and open-ended 
35%.  As shown in Table VII, the other elicitation mechanisms are typically represented by one 
or two papers and provide between one and four observations.  Moreover, some elicitation 
mechanisms are typically associated with a particular type of good, e.g., a Smith auction or a 
referendum is normally associated with a public good, and a Vickrey or first-price sealed bid 
auction is usually for private goods.  This correlation makes it difficult to isolate the effects of 
the elicitation mechanism from the type of good.  Because of this, we refrain from using dummy 
variables for each mechanism.  Instead, we create a new dummy variable that aggregates the 
elicitation mechanisms into two groups.  The dummy variable Choice equals one for studies that 
use a choice-based elicitation (dichotomous choice, polychotomous choice, payment card, 
referendum), and Choice equals zero for the remaining elicitation mechanisms.   
 Some studies report descriptive statistics such as mean WTP (e.g., Bohm (1972)).  
However, there has been a recent growth in the number of studies that attempt to calibrate 
responses either by getting unbiased responses from individuals ex ante (also referred to as 
instrument calibration, e.g. cheap talk) or by adjusting for the biased responses ex post (statistical 
calibration, e.g. uncertainty adjustments).  The variable Calibrate equals one if the observation is 
based on any type of calibration technique.   
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IV. Estimation Procedures and Results 
There is no theory explaining hypothetical bias that could provide guidance as to the appropriate 
model specification.  Therefore, we limit our choice of variables to research protocol and study 
characteristics for which data were readily available.  We begin with a simple double log 
regression model (Model 1a) that explains actual value as a function of the hypothetical value: 
 ( )20 1 2lnActValue lnHypValue lnHypValueβ β β ε= + ⋅ + ⋅ + , (1) 
where lnActValue and lnHypValue denote the natural log of the actual and hypothetical values.6 
Because White’s test indicates the presence of heteroskadasticity (p-value 0.0002), Table VIII 
reports the results from a weighted regression, using the square root of lnHypValue to transform 
the data.7  This simple specification fits the data quite well, with an adjusted R2 of 0.83.  All the 
coefficients are positive and significant at the 10% level.  The results indicate that for the range 
of hypothetical values in our sample, the bias increases as the hypothetical value increases.  
When evaluated at the mean hypothetical value (26.55), the predicted actual value is 10.24 which 
yields a calibration factor of 2.59.  When the model is evaluated at the median hypothetical value 
(7.18), we get a predicted actual value of 3.89 and a 1.84 calibration factor.  Interestingly, these 
estimates are roughly consistent with NOAA’s calibration factor of two. 
<INSERT TABLE VIII> 
 To determine whether there are some factors that may help explain the cause of this bias, 
we estimated the following model (Model 2a): 
 ( )20 1 2 3 4
6 7 .5
lnActValue lnHypValue lnHypValue Student Private
+ Within Choice Calibrate
β β β β β
β β β ε
= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +  (2) 
The results for Model 2a are in Table VIII.  When all independent variables are evaluated at their 
means, the resulting predicted actual value is 8.83 and the CF is 3.01.  Evaluating the model at 
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the median of the independent variables yields a CF of 2.47.  Variables with positive coefficients 
are associated with larger actual values and, therefore, lower hypothetical bias; negative 
coefficients have the opposite interpretation.  The intercept and the coefficient on the quadratic 
term for lnHypValue continue to be positive and significant.  The coefficient for Within is also 
positive and significant; this would be consistent with the possibility that in a within-group 
study, participants might try to maintain some consistency between their hypothetical and actual 
values.  Private was significant in LG’s results, but not in our Model 2a.  Calibration techniques 
appear to be effective at reducing hypothetical bias.  
The positive and significant coefficient for Choice indicates that the choice elicitation 
mechanisms (dichotomous and polychotomous choice, referendum, payment card and conjoint) 
are associated with less hypothetical bias.  There may be several reasons for this finding. First, 
substitutes are made explicit in the choice format and this may encourage respondents to explore 
their preferences and tradeoffs in more detail.  Neoclassical theory indicates that if few 
substitutes are considered, respondents will likely express a higher WTP than if many are 
considered, all else equal.  From a psychological perspective, the process of making choices is 
quite different from that of pricing, as in open ended CV (Brown (1984; Irwin, et al. (1993; 
McKenzie (1993)).  Another factor is that some choice formats, like conjoint, allow respondents 
to express ambivalence, indifference or uncertainty directly. Since a high level of uncertainty is 
often associated with significant hypothetical bias, choice formats may produce less bias 
(Champ, et al. (1997)). 
The negative coefficient on Student suggests that there may also be a subject pool effect.  
However, since all the studies in our sample that use students are laboratory experiments, it is 
unclear whether the cause of hypothetical bias is the subject pool or the setting.  We replaced the 
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Student variable in equation 2 with a Group dummy variable that equals one if values were 
elicited in a group setting such as a lab experiment, rather than an individual setting such as a 
phone or mail survey.  The correlation between Student and Group variables is 0.77.  The results 
of this regression are in Table VIII, Model 2b.  The coefficient for Group is negative and 
significant, therefore, although there is clearly an effect, we cannot distinguish whether the cause 
is the subject pool or the setting.   
In Model 2b, Calibrate is no longer significant, and Private is now significant at the 5% 
level possibly suggesting some sensitivity to model specification.  In the absence of a theory that 
explains the relationship between hypothetical and actual values, we hesitate to place much 
emphasis on the significance of particular dummy variables.  Moreover, there may simply not be 
sufficient variability in the data to capture some of these effects.  For example, all but one of the 
observations for which Calibrate equals one use a between-group comparison.  Instead, we note 
that most of the variation is explained by the simple Model 1a and make the primary conclusion 
that hypothetical bias increases with larger hypothetical values.  For smaller hypothetical values 
that are common in CV studies, our results suggest that hypothetical bias may not be a major 
problem.  For example, the predicted CF from a $10 hypothetical value is essentially one, a 
$21.50 hypothetical value produces a 1.50 CF, and a CF of 2 results from a $32.50 hypothetical 
value.  The Group/Student and the Choice dummy variables are consistently significant and are 
therefore likely to have some impact on hypothetical bias. We also tested the sensitivity of our 
results to extreme values by dropping the five largest CFs and re-estimating equation 2.  The 
results of this trimmed model (Model 3), provided in Table VIII, are generally consistent with 
those of Model 2.   
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There are a few studies that provide a relatively large number of observations.  To control 
for the possibility that our results could be unduly influenced by such studies, we calculated the 
mean hypothetical and actual values from each study for a given set of independent variables.  
With this approach, it is still possible for a study to provide more than one observation.  In the 
case of Sinden (1988), for example, 17 observations were reduced to two: the mean of the 16 
observations that use students, and the single observation that uses adults.  The resulting data set 
has 45 observations.  The mean CF is 3.26 and the median is 1.50.  Table IX summarizes the 
regression results.  Consistent with the results in Table VIII (which uses the full data set), the 
hypothetical value seems to be the best predictor of actual value (for every regression in Tables 
VIII and IX, an F-test of the null hypothesis that 1 2 0β β= =  in equations 1 and 2 is rejected at 
the 1% level of significance).  In Models 3c and 3d, none of the coefficients are individually 
significant and an F-test for the joint significance of all the dummy variables is also rejected. 
However, β1 and β2 are jointly significant, and in a separate linear model that omits the quadratic 
term, β1 becomes highly significant reinforcing the conclusion about the significance of 
hypothetical values.  In the Expanded Models (2c and 2d), both Group/Student and Choice are 
again significant, but the significance of other dummy variables appears sensitive to model 
choice. 
<INSERT TABLE IX> 
Because conclusions about the significance of most of the dummy variables is rather 
sensitive, another way to gauge whether a variable has an effect on hypothetical bias is to ask 
whether the CF changes as the variable changes within a particular study.  Some studies report 
multiple observations because they are testing the effects of a particular variable.  For example, 
nine of the ten studies that use a calibration technique report observations for which Calibrate=1 
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and Calibrate=0.8  The authors then compare the hypothetical bias with and without calibration 
to test its effectiveness.  In each of these nine studies, the mean CF using a calibration technique 
is less than the mean CF for the uncalibrated observations, suggesting that calibration techniques 
are effective at reducing hypothetical bias.  When the observations from these nine studies are 
combined, the mean CF for the 15 observations that do not use a calibration is 5.42 with a 
standard deviation of 6.32, and the median is 2.66.  There were another 15 observations that used 
a calibration technique; the mean was 1.59, standard deviation 1.02 and median 1.18.  As one 
might expect, the mean and median CF are lower for those observations that use a calibration 
technique.  A Wilcoxon rank sum test confirms that this difference is highly significant at the 1% 
level.   
 
V. Conclusions 
This paper presents a meta-analysis of hypothetical bias in WTP contingent valuation studies.  
We find that the primary factor that explains this bias is the magnitude of the hypothetical value.  
Attempts to identify other factors that may be associated with hypothetical bias yielded mixed 
results.  In all the models we estimated, the coefficients for the Group/Student and Choice 
dummy variables were consistently significant and of large magnitude.  We, therefore, cautiously 
note that these factors may be associated with hypothetical bias.  In addition, a comparison of 
calibration factors within particular studies indicates that calibration techniques are effective at 
reducing hypothetical bias.   
 We are reluctant to over-emphasize the significance of the dummy variables because a 
meta-analysis of hypothetical bias appears to be very sensitive to model specification, a lack of 
variability in the data, and treatment of extreme values.  In addition, some of our findings differ 
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from those in LG.  For example, a consistent result in LG was that private goods had a lower and 
statistically significant CF than public goods, but our results on this conclusion are mixed, 
depending upon model specification.  One variable that we found to consistently be statistically 
significant (Student/Group) was not significant in LG (their Lab variable). 
We believe that this is a consequence of several factors.  First, half of the calibration 
factors are between 0.85 and 1.50, and 70% of the calibration factors are below 2.  However, as 
shown in Figure 1, the sample has severe positive skewness (value equals 2.44).  The mean CF 
for the top 10 observations is 10.3, compared with 1.54 for the other 73 observations.  This 
means that econometric estimates of hypothetical bias can often be driven by a few observations.  
Second, the need to use large sets of dummy variables and the multicollinearity associated with 
them can make it difficult to isolate the impact of factors that might be responsible for 
hypothetical bias.  For example, in the LG data, provision point mechanisms and Smith auctions 
are only associated with public goods and Vickrey auctions only with private goods. In our data, 
only one of the studies that uses a calibration technique also uses a between group comparison.  
And, since a comprehensive theory of hypothetical bias has not been developed, model 
specification is generally based on intuition.  As a result, the sensitivity of hypothetical bias 
meta-analyses should not be surprising.  This means that our ability to determine the factors 
responsible for this bias is quite limited, and that estimates of statistical significance associated 
with several potentially important determinants of bias should be viewed with caution.  
However, the evidence is quite strong that there is a positive quadratic relationship between 
hypothetical values and hypothetical bias, and the results of our Model 1 may provide some 
insights into the potential magnitude of this bias. As shown in Figure 1, 70% of the studies 
examined here report CFs less than two, and only 30% report CFs that exceed 2.  Consequently, 
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hypothetical bias may not be as significant a problem in stated preference analyses as is often 
thought. 
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Table I.  Original and Revised LG Results 
 Estimated coefficients  (standard errors) 
Variable Original Revision 1a Revision 2b Revision 3c 
Constant  1.98 (0.49) ***  2.27 (0.50) ***  1.66 (0.45) ***  2.21 (0.68) *** 
Laboratory (X1)  -0.32 (0.23)   -0.17 (0.23)   -0.31 (0.20)  -0.47 (0.28)  
WTP (X2)  -0.65 (0.33) *  -0.61 (0.33) *  0.10 (0.33)  0.38 (0.47)  
Private good (X3)  -0.64 (0.30) **  -0.85 (0.32) **  -0.74 (0.28) **  -1.04 (0.36) *** 
Within group (X4)  -0.01 (0.22)   -0.11 (0.23)   -0.20 (0.20)  -0.49 (0.28) * 
Type of elicitation:     
   Open-ended (X5)  0.15 (0.28)  -0.32 (0.28)  -0.39 (0.24)  -1.17 (0.42) ** 
   First price sealed bid (X6)  -1.70 (0.75) **  -1.78 (0.75) **  -1.28 (0.65) *  -1.52 (0.78) * 
   Provision point (X7)  0.54 (0.61)  0.05 (0.79)  0.09 (0.67)  -0.58 (0.83)  
   Smith auction (X8)  0.32 (0.53)  0.01 (0.54)   -1.11 (0.53) ** — d 
   Random price auction (X9)  -0.76 (0.63)  -1.13 (0.77)   -0.41 (0.68)  -0.20 (0.85) 
   BDM (X10)  -0.34 (0.47)  -0.24 (0.55)  -0.44 (0.47)  -0.97 (0.55) * 
   Dichotomous choice (X11)  -0.30 (0.25)  -0.43 (0.26) *  -0.40 (0.22) *  -0.67 (0.33) * 
Sample size 58 54 52 32 
Adjusted R2 0.33 0.32 0.17 0.30 
F 3.55 3.30 1.97 2.36 
p-value 0.001 0.003 0.058 0.047 
Dependent variable is the natural log of the median calibration factor in List and Gallet (2001).   
*** Significant at 1% level. ** Significant at 5% level. * Significant at 10% level. 
a Corrects LG data for errors listed in Table II. 
b Corrects LG data for errors listed in Table II (Revision 1) and drops two WTA observations with a calibration factor greater than 20 from Brookshire and 
Coursey (1987).  
c Corrects LG data for errors listed in Table II (Revision 1) and interpretation differences listed in Table IV. 
d Variable dropped because no observations with a Smith auction. 
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Table II.  Typos and Coding Errors in the LG Data a 
LG Study LG CF 
Type of 
difference Variable 
LG 
Coding 
Our 
Coding Comments 
Bishop and Heberlein 
(1986) 
1.30-2.30; 
0.80 ERE typo Study B&H 1986 H&B 1986
Values are from Heberlein and 
Bishop, 1986, not Bishop 1986. 
Kealy, et al. (1988) 1.00 - 2.00 ERE typo Study 1988 1990 Typo in ERE paper 
Irwin, et al. (1992) 
1.00;  
2.50 ERE typo all     
Study is in LG regression data, 
but missing from ERE paper 
Kealy, et al. (1988) 1.40 ERE typo all     
Study is in LG regression data, 
but missing from ERE paper 
Kealy, et al. (1988) 1.30 ERE typo all     
Study is in LG regression data, 
but missing from ERE paper. 
Observation from Kealy, et al. 
(1990). 
Loomis, et al. (1996) 2.00 - 3.60 ERE typo  elicitation dc open-ended
Correct in LG data, but typo in 
Table V in ERE paper 
Boyce, et al. (1992) 0.90 
could not 
find     
not 
included 
Could not find this observation in 
the paper. 
Kealy, et al. (1990) 1.30 
could not 
find     
not 
included 
Could not find this observation in 
the paper. 
Balistreri, et al. 
(2001) 0.58 error CF 0.58 1.58 Typo in LG data and ERE paper 
Bohm (1972) 
1.16; 
1.16; 
1.34 error  comparison within between   
a These are the changes made for the Revision 1 regression in Table I. 
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Table II (cont.).  Typos and Coding Errors in the LG Data a 
 
LG Study LG CF 
Type of 
difference Variable 
LG 
Coding 
Our 
Coding Comments 
Dickie, et al. (1987) 1.00 error  elicitation 
dichot. 
choice open-ended
Actually a posted offer. 
Experimenter names a price, 
subjects chooses any quantity.  It 
is not dichotomous choice 
because subject can choose any 
quantity. 
Fox, et al. (1998) 1.20 error  comparison between within 
LG CF appears to be ratio of 
survey/final bid for irradiated 
pork.  This is a within group 
comparison. 
Heberlein and Bishop 
(1986) 1.30 - 2.30 error  elicitation open-ended 
CF=2.26,
open-ended. 
CF=1.33,
first-price.
LG present as a range, we split 
into two observations. The 1.30 
CF uses a 1st price sealed bid 
(error in LG), and the 2.30 CF is 
open-ended (OK in LG).   
Heberlein and Bishop 
(1986) 0.80 error CF 0.80 1.13 
Appears that LG CF 0.80 is 
inverse CF (actual/hypothetical) 
using the 1.24 CF reported in 
H&B 1986. (0.80=1/1.24).  Our 
CF=1.13 is from Bishop and 
Heberlein (1990). 
Kealy, et al. (1988) 1.40 error  good public private   
a These are the changes made for the Revision 1 regression in Table I. 
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Table II (cont.).  Typos and Coding Errors in the LG Data a 
 
LG Study LG CF 
Type of 
difference Variable 
LG 
Coding 
Our 
Coding  Comments 
List and Shogren 
(1998) 1.42 error CF 1.42 
not 
included 
Two issues 
1. LG used CF=actual/hyp 
2. This result is repeated in List 
Shogren 2002, so we deleted to 
avoid double counting. 
List and Shogren 
(2002) b 0.70 - 1.66 error CF 0.70 - 1.66 0.60 - 1.41
LG used CF=actual/hyp.  Should 
be hyp/actual. 
McClelland, et al. 
(1993) 2.20 error  comparison between within   
McClelland, et al. 
(1993) 0.80 error  comparison between within   
Navrud (1992) 3.20 error  good private public   
Neill, et al. (1994) 3.10-25.10 error  elicitation open-ended Vickrey 
For these two CFs, both hyp and 
actual use Vickrey 
Spencer, et al. (1998) 4.66 error CF 4.66 
not 
included 
There is only one CF for both 
Pond A and Pond B (4.67).  LG 
appear to double count. 
a These are the changes made for the Revision 1 regression in Table I. 
b This is listed as List and Shogren (1999) in LG because at the time the paper was forthcoming. 
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Table III.  Frequency Distribution for LG Data after Correcting Typos and Errorsa 
Variable IX. Value 
Number of 
observations 
Number of 
Studies b 
Type of Experiment Laboratory 33 17 
 Field or field/lab 22 12 
WTP / WTA WTP 47 25 
 WTA 8 6 
Type of Good Private 42 22 
 Public 13 7 
Type of comparison Within 18 12 
 Between 37 21 
Type of elicitation Open-ended  12 8 
 First price sealed bid  1 1 
 Provision point  2 1 
 Smith auction  4 1 
 Random price auction  1 1 
 BDM  2 1 
 Dichotomous choice 20 14 
 Vickrey 13 7 
 TOTALS 55 29 
a Corrections for typos and errors are listed in Table II. 
b For each variable, the sum could exceed the total number of studies because some studies generate multiple types of observations.  For example, Brookshire 
and Coursey (1987) have two WTP observations and two WTA observations, so this study is counted as providing both a WTP and a WTA observation.   
  
22
Table IV.  Differences in Interpretation about How to Code Data a 
LG Study LG CF 
Type of 
difference Variable 
LG 
Coding 
Our 
Coding Comments 
Balistreri, et al. 
(2001) 1.25 interpret elicitation  
open-
ended 
not 
included 
Hypothetical and actual 
elicitation mechanisms differ. 
Balistreri, et al. 
(2001) 
1.54, 
0.58 interpret elicitation  
dichot. 
choice 
not 
included 
Hypothetical and actual 
elicitation mechanisms differ. 
Bishop and 
Heberlein (1979) 0.30 – 1.60 interpret  WTP/WTA   
not 
included 
Study does not have actual WTP.  
LG appear to use hyp WTP / 
actual WTA.  
Bohm (1972) 
1.00, 
1.16 interpret  elicitation 
 open-
ended 
not 
included 
Hypothetical and actual 
elicitation mechanisms differ. 
Bohm (1972) 1.34 interpret  elicitation 
 open-
ended 
not 
included 
The hypothetical elicitation uses a 
provision point, but the actual 
does not. Hypothetical and actual 
elicitation mechanisms differ. 
Fox, et al. (1998) 
1.20,  
1.50 interpret  elicitation 
open-
ended 
not 
included 
Hypothetical and actual 
elicitation mechanisms differ. 
Irwin, et al. (1992) 
1.00, 
2.50 interpret  CF   
not 
included 
Cannot get CFs. Would have to 
infer from the charts. 
Navrud (1992) 
3.20, 
1.60 – 2.10 interpret  elicitation 
 dichot. 
choice 
not 
included 
Hypothetical elicitation was a 
newspaper ad that did not 
mention contributions. 
Brookshire and 
Coursey (1987) 
2.00, 1.85, 
28.20, 25.79 interpret  elicitation Smith 
not 
included 
Hypothetical and actual 
elicitation mechanisms differ. 
Coursey, et al. 
(1987) 
1.00, 
2.00 interpret  elicitation Vickrey 
not 
included 
Hypothetical and actual 
elicitation mechanisms differ. 
a These are the changes made for the Revision 3 regression in Table I. 
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Table V.  Variable Definitions 
Variable Name Description 
Study Name of study 
LGStudy 1 = Study included in List and Gallet analysis, 0 = otherwise. 
lnHypValue Natural log of the hypothetical value 
lnActValue Natural log of the actual value (assuming real cash payments represent unbiased estimates of actual value) 
CF Calibration factor (= Hypothetical Value / Actual Value)  
Student 1 = subjects were college students, 0 = non-students 
Group 1 = values elicited in group setting (e.g., lab) 0 = values elicited in individual setting (e.g., phone or mail survey) 
Private 1 = Private good, 0 = Public good 
Within 1 = Within group comparison, 0 = Between group comparison 
Choice 
1 = Choice-based elicitation mechanism 
• Dichotomous and polychotomous choice, referendum, payment 
card  
0 = Market-based elicitation mechanism 
• First-price sealed bid, open-ended, BDM, random n-th price, 
Vickrey 
Calibrate 
1 = ex ante or ex post calibration applied 
0 = no calibration applied 
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Table VI. Descriptive Statistics 
 Hypothetical Value Actual Value CF 
Mean 26.55 11.69 2.60 
Median 7.18 3.67 1.35 
Standard deviation 47.33 18.05 3.52 
Minimum 0.08 0.07 0.76 
Maximum 301 95.5 25.08 
N 83 83 83 
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Table VII. Dummy Variable Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Value 
Number of 
observations 
Number of 
Studies a 
Subject Pool College students 35 11 
 Non-college 
students 
48 21 
Type of Setting Group 46 15 
 Individual 37 13 
Type of Good Private 41 14 
 Public 42 14 
Type of comparison Within 28 8 
 Between 55 24 
Non-choice-based elicitation Open-ended  29 8 
 Vickrey 16 6 
 
First price sealed 
bid  
1 1 
 
Random price 
auction  
4 1 
 BDM  2 1 
Choice-based elicitation Dichotomous 
choice 
23 12 
 Referendum 1 1 
 Payment card 4 1 
 Polychot. choice 3 2 
Calibrate Ex ante or ex post 
calibration 
17 10 
 
No calibration 
used 
66 27 
 TOTALS 83 28 
a For each variable, the sum could exceed the total number of studies because some studies generate multiple types 
of observations.   
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Table VIII. Regression Results Using All Observations a 
 Base model Expanded model Trimmed model b 
  Model 1a Model 2a Model 2b Model 3a Model 3b 
 Variable Coefficient  
Std 
error Coefficient
Std 
error Coefficient
Std 
error Coefficient
Std 
error Coefficient
Std 
error 
Intercept    0.199 *** 0.035  0.357 ** 0.163  0.528 *** 0.189  0.230 0.146  0.322 * 0.169 
lnHypValue   0.498 *** 0.096  0.171 0.139  0.152 0.139  0.284 ** 0.129  0.273 ** 0.129 
lnHypValue2  0.046 * 0.026  0.096 *** 0.029  0.091 *** 0.028  0.092 *** 0.027  0.089 *** 0.027 
Student        -0.470 *** 0.14    -0.244 * 0.130   
Group      -0.539 *** 0.151    -0.292 ** 0.142 
Private        0.105 0.124  0.293 ** 0.118  0.122 0.111  0.227 ** 0.107 
Within         0.326 ** 0.144  0.233 * 0.134  0.222 * 0.129  0.183 0.121 
Choice      0.508 *** 0.154  0.465 *** 0.149  0.365 ** 0.139  0.351 ** 0.135 
Calibrate        0.296 ** 0.135  0.122 0.137  0.217 * 0.117  0.126 0.119 
n 77 77 77 72 72 
Adj R2 0.83 0.86 0.87 0.90 0.91 
F 188.72 70.50 71.99 97.28 98.37 
p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
a Weighted least squares estimates. Dependent variable is the natural log of the actual value (lnActValue).  
*** Significant at 1% level. ** Significant at 5% level. * Significant at 10% level. 
b Trimmed regression – dropped highest five calibration factors. 
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Table IX. Regression Results Using Average Values Per Study a 
 Base model Expanded model Trimmed model b 
  Model 1b Model 2c Model 2d Model 3c Model 3d 
 Variable Coefficient  
Std 
error Coefficient
Std 
error Coefficient
Std 
error Coefficient
Std 
error Coefficient
Std 
error 
Intercept    0.215 0.204  0.408 0.285  0.752 ** 0.338 0.188 0.241 0.315 0.295 
lnHypValue   0.507 ** 0.238  0.112 0.276  -0.010 0.282 0.359 0.261 0.305 0.274 
lnHypValue2  0.035 0.052  0.100 * 0.054  0.111 ** 0.054 0.081 0.052 0.086 0.053 
Student        -0.506 *** 0.177   -0.200 0.151   
Group      -0.662 *** 0.216   -0.258 0.195 
Private        0.243 0.172  0.409 ** 0.175 0.177 0.142 0.255 0.153 
Within         0.189 0.207  0.225 0.205 0.183 0.166 0.204 0.168 
Choice      0.471 ** 0.212  0.418 ** 0.204 0.221 0.182 0.207 0.178 
Calibrate        0.286 0.194  0.118 0.192 0.175 0.153 0.114 0.152 
n 42 42 42 37 37 
Adj R2 0.68 0.74 0.75 0.86 0.86 
F 45.08 18.02 18.72 31.45 31.46 
p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
a Weighted least squares estimates. Dependent variable is the natural log of the actual value (lnActValue).  
*** Significant at 1% level. ** Significant at 5% level. * Significant at 10% level. 
b Trimmed regression – dropped highest five calibration factors. 
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Figure 1.  Distribution of Calibration Factors 
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Appendix A. Data Used in the Analysis 
Study LGStudy HypValue ActValue CF Student Group Private Within Elicitation Choice Calibrate
Blumenschein, et al. (1997) 0 11.97 3.24 3.69 1 1 1 0 Vickrey 0 0 
Blumenschein, et al. (1997) 0 11.97 1.02 11.74 1 1 1 1 Vickrey 0 0 
Blumenschein, et al. (2001) 0 10.59 8.97 1.18 0 0 1 0 dichot. choice 1 1 
Blumenschein, et al. (2001) 0 16.20 8.97 1.81 0 0 1 0 dichot. choice 1 1 
Blumenschein, et al. (2001) 0 29.23 8.97 3.26 0 0 1 0 dichot. choice 1 0 
Bohm (1972) 1 1.76 1.77 0.99 0 1 1 0 open-ended 0 0 
Bohm (1972) 1 2.04 2.07 0.99 0 1 1 1 open-ended 0 0 
Bohm (1972) 1 1.76 1.52 1.15 0 1 1 0 open-ended 0 0 
Bohm (1972) 1 1.76 1.46 1.20 0 1 1 0 open-ended 0 0 
Botelho and Costa Pinto (2002) 0 1.39 1.40 0.99 1 1 0 0 open-ended 0 1 
Botelho and Costa Pinto (2002) 0 16.14 1.40 11.51 1 1 0 0 open-ended 0 0 
Boyce, et al. (1989) 1 6.06 4.81 1.26 0 1 1 1 BDM 0 0 
Boyce, et al. (1989) 1 16.80 7.81 2.15 0 1 1 1 BDM 0 0 
Brown, et al. (1996) 1 18.98 4.62 4.11 0 0 0 0 open-ended 0 0 
Brown, et al. (1996) 1 46.55 7.22 6.45 0 0 0 0 dichot. choice 1 0 
Brown and Taylor (2000) 0 27.97 3.23 8.66 0 1 0 0 open-ended 0 0 
Brown and Taylor (2000) 0 72.22 6.14 11.76 0 1 0 0 open-ended 0 0 
Cameron, et al. (2002) 0 6.13 4.08 1.50 0 0 0 0 dichot. choice 1 0 
Carlsson and Martinsson (2001) 0 0.08 0.07 1.13 1 1 0 1 choice 1 0 
Champ, et al. (1997) 0 12.00 9.00 1.33 0 0 0 0 dichot. choice 1 1 
Champ, et al. (1997) 0 52.00 9.00 5.78 0 0 0 0 dichot. choice 1 0 
Champ, et al. (1997) 0 79.00 9.00 8.78 0 0 0 0 dichot. choice 1 0 
Champ and C. (2001) 0 101.00 59.00 1.71 0 0 0 0 dichot. choice 1 0 
Duffield and Patterson (1992) 0 14.92 17.69 0.84 0 0 0 0 payment card 1 0 
Duffield and Patterson (1992) 0 15.26 17.69 0.86 0 0 0 0 payment card 1 0 
Duffield and Patterson (1992) 0 31.18 28.43 1.10 0 0 0 0 payment card 1 0 
Duffield and Patterson (1992) 0 31.85 28.43 1.12 0 0 0 0 payment card 1 0 
Frykblom (1997) 1 17.69 11.79 1.50 1 1 1 0 dichot. choice 1 0 
Frykblom (2000) 1 11.80 8.88 1.33 1 1 1 0 Vickrey 0 0 
 
  
30
Appendix A (cont.). Data Used in the Analysis 
Study LGStudy HypValue ActValue CF Student Group Private Within Elicitation Choice Calibrate
Heberlein and Bishop (1986) 1 35.00 31.00 1.13 0 0 1 0 dichot. choice 1 0 
Heberlein and Bishop (1986) 1 32.00 24.00 1.33 0 0 1 0 1st price sealed-bid 0 0 
Heberlein and Bishop (1986) 1 43.00 19.00 2.26 0 0 1 0 open-ended 0 0 
Johannesson, et al. (1998) 1 3.39 4.22 0.80 1 1 1 0 dichot. choice 1 1 
Johannesson, et al. (1998) 1 3.39 3.85 0.88 1 1 1 1 dichot. choice 1 1 
Johannesson, et al. (1998) 1 4.97 4.22 1.18 1 1 1 0 dichot. choice 1 0 
Johannesson, et al. (1998) 1 4.97 3.85 1.29 1 1 1 1 dichot. choice 1 0 
Kealy, et al. (1988) 1 0.79 0.56 1.41 1 1 1 0 dichot. choice 1 0 
Kealy, et al. (1988) 1 0.81 0.56 1.45 1 1 1 1 dichot. choice 1 0 
List (2001) 0 26.15 25.60 1.02 0 0 1 0 Vickrey 0 1 
List (2001) 0 107.89 59.56 1.81 0 0 1 0 Vickrey 0 1 
List (2001) 0 49.03 25.60 1.92 0 0 1 0 Vickrey 0 0 
List (2001) 0 116.09 59.56 1.95 0 0 1 0 Vickrey 0 0 
List (2003) 0 2.58 2.78 0.93 0 0 1 0 Vickrey 0 1 
List (2003) 0 3.54 3.42 1.04 0 0 1 0 random n-th price 0 1 
List (2003) 0 4.97 3.67 1.35 0 0 1 0 random n-th price 0 1 
List (2003) 0 7.18 3.67 1.96 0 0 1 0 random n-th price 0 0 
List (2003) 0 5.05 2.28 2.21 0 0 1 0 Vickrey 0 1 
List (2003) 0 8.65 3.42 2.53 0 0 1 0 random n-th price 0 0 
List (2003) 0 7.40 2.78 2.66 0 0 1 0 Vickrey 0 0 
List (2003) 0 6.67 2.28 2.93 0 0 1 0 Vickrey 0 0 
List and Shogren (1998) 1 208.80 95.50 2.19 0 0 1 1 Vickrey 0 0 
List and Shogren (1998) 1 142.02 55.87 2.54 0 0 1 1 Vickrey 0 0 
List and Shogren (1998) 1 91.71 26.40 3.47 0 0 1 1 Vickrey 0 0 
Loomis, et al. (1997) 1 28.00 11.00 2.55 0 1 1 0 dichot. choice 1 0 
Loomis, et al. (1997) 1 33.00 11.00 3.00 0 1 1 0 dichot. choice 1 0 
MacMillan, et al. (1999) 0 2.18 2.37 0.92 0 0 0 0 open-ended 0 1 
MacMillan, et al. (1999) 0 3.97 2.37 1.67 0 0 0 0 open-ended 0 0 
Murphy, et al. (2002) 0 4.32 0.96 4.50 1 1 0 0 dichot. choice 1 1 
Murphy, et al. (2002) 0 8.51 0.96 8.86 1 1 0 0 dichot. choice 1 0 
Neill, et al. (1994) 1 31.00 10.00 3.10 1 1 1 0 Vickrey 0 1 
Neill, et al. (1994) 1 301.00 12.00 25.08 1 1 1 0 Vickrey 0 0 
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Appendix A (cont.). Data Used in the Analysis 
Study LGStudy HypValue ActValue CF Student Group Private Within Elicitation Choice Calibrate
Sinden (1988) 1 0.70 0.92 0.76 1 1 0 1 open-ended 0 0 
Sinden (1988) 1 1.43 1.86 0.77 1 1 0 1 open-ended 0 0 
Sinden (1988) 1 1.01 1.28 0.79 1 1 0 1 open-ended 0 0 
Sinden (1988) 1 0.79 0.92 0.86 1 1 0 1 open-ended 0 0 
Sinden (1988) 1 1.10 1.28 0.86 1 1 0 1 open-ended 0 0 
Sinden (1988) 1 2.40 2.76 0.87 0 1 0 1 open-ended 0 0 
Sinden (1988) 1 0.84 0.92 0.91 1 1 0 1 open-ended 0 0 
Sinden (1988) 1 1.06 1.12 0.95 1 1 0 1 open-ended 0 0 
Sinden (1988) 1 1.30 1.28 1.02 1 1 0 1 open-ended 0 0 
Sinden (1988) 1 1.36 1.28 1.06 1 1 0 1 open-ended 0 0 
Sinden (1988) 1 1.22 1.12 1.09 1 1 0 1 open-ended 0 0 
Sinden (1988) 1 2.06 1.86 1.11 1 1 0 1 open-ended 0 0 
Sinden (1988) 1 1.60 1.40 1.14 1 1 0 1 open-ended 0 0 
Sinden (1988) 1 1.60 1.40 1.14 1 1 0 1 open-ended 0 0 
Sinden (1988) 1 2.38 1.87 1.27 1 1 0 1 open-ended 0 0 
Sinden (1988) 1 1.27 0.92 1.38 1 1 0 1 open-ended 0 0 
Sinden (1988) 1 2.10 1.40 1.50 1 1 0 1 open-ended 0 0 
Spencer, et al. (1998) 1 4.70 3.16 1.49 1 1 0 0 tri-chot. choice 1 0 
Spencer, et al. (1998) 1 3.24 2.10 1.54 1 1 0 0 tri-chot. choice 1 0 
Vossler, et al. (2003) 0 49.67 48.89 1.02 0 0 0 0 referendum 1 1 
Vossler, et al. (2003) 0 75.43 48.89 1.54 0 0 0 0 referendum 1 1 
Vossler and Kerkvliet (2003) 0 52.27 51.75 1.01 0 0 0 0 referendum 1 0 
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NOTES 
                                                 
1  The Carson, et al. (1996) comparison of revealed and SP studies indicated a strong correlation (0.89) between 
hypothetical and market behavior, but since revealed preference measures, like estimates derived from travel 
cost studies, contain substantial unexplained variation, Carson et al. test SP convergent validity. List and Gallet 
(2001) and Harrison and Rutström (2002) test SP criterion validity because a ‘true’ measure of value is obtained 
from actual payments for the good being valued. 
2  Thanks to John List and Craig Gallet for sharing their original data files for this analysis of their results. 
3  Note that the term “median” calibration factor refers to the midpoint between the minimum and maximum 
values within a range, not the median of all the calibration factors in a single study. 
4  In our reconsideration of the LG results, we also tested sensitivity to the functional form and got similar results. 
5  Neill et al. (1994) also report a very high calibration factor (25.1), but since this was part of a range of values 
for which the median calibration factor was used, this value was not omitted. 
6  LG use the natural log of calibration factor as the dependent variable in their model. It is straightforward to 
show that our equation (1) can also be specified using the log of the inverse of the calibration factor as the 
dependent variable: 1 20 1 2ln( )CF lnHypValue lnHypValueβ β β ε− ′= + ⋅ + ⋅ +  where 1 1 1β β′ = − .  LG note that 
they also estimated a model using ln(CF-1) and found that this did not affect their conclusions. 
7  This transformation required that six of the 83 observations be dropped due to negative lnHypValue. 
8  We only did this simple comparison for Calibrate because none of the other dummy variables had a sufficient 
number of studies to conduct a within-study analysis of its effects. 
